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1.  Introduction 
Languages like Italian have tensed forms of the verb which, in interaction with 
temporal adverbs, express the location of an event in time. For example, the 
italicized verb forms in the Italian sentences (1a)-(1c), in interaction with the 
temporal adverbs in parentheses, locate a particular event in the past, the 
present and the future, respectively: 
 
(1) a. (Ieri) il presidente dell’UCI era a Bruxelles. 
 ‘The president of UCI was in Brussels (yesterday).’ 
 b. (Questa mattina) il presidente dell’UCI è a Bruxelles. 
 ‘The president of UCI is in Brussels (this morning).’ 
 c. (Domani) il presidente dell’UCI sarà a Bruxelles. 
 ‘The president of UCI will be in Brussels (tomorrow).’ 
 
The verb forms in question do this with respect to a reference point—typically, 
the moment at which the sentence is uttered. The past, present and future of 
(1a)-(1c) are, respectively, past, present and future with respect to that 
moment, which we may call “the hic et nunc of the utterance”. This can be seen 
as the “zero point” from which every event is apprehended. 
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The property just mentioned makes tense, by and large, an indexical 
category: to determine its contribution to meaning, we must first identify the 
context of utterance. For example, suppose that you run into an utterance of 
(1b)—maybe you see an inscription of this message in a letter, or you foresee it 
through the powers of your imagination as a future utterance—but you are not 
aware of the hic et nunc of it, so that you don’t know whether the sentence was 
uttered one year ago or will be uttered in a century from now. Until you don’t 
identify the hic et nunc of this utterance, you won’t be able to determine its full 
meaning (being now September 1st 2020, does the utterance mean that the UCI 
president was in Brussels in the morning of September 1st 2019? or does it mean 
that she will be in Brussels in the morning of September 1st 2120?). 
Linguists have viewed the function referred to above as fundamental to 
tense. Accordingly, they have defined tense as the grammaticalised expression 
of location in time. Bernard Comrie expresses this view in the following passage: 
 
“[For grammatical categories, including tense, w]hat one finds most 
typically is the choice of the speech situation as the reference point 
[…]. As far as tense is concerned, then, the reference point is typically 
the present moment, and tenses locate situations either at the same 
time as the present moment, or prior to the present moment, or 
subsequent to the present moment.”  (Comrie 1985) 
 
The location of events in time is fundamental to human experience. Our 
lives happen in time, as successions of events. An important function of language 
is to represent the events making up our personal lives and our public history 
by locating those events within an established temporal frame and by 
determinining temporal relations (before, after, etc.) between them on the 
background of such a frame. In this function, language does an invaluable 
service to memory—both to “private” memory about events from our personal 
lives and to “public” memory about events from our common history. In this 
article I consider the subject of the temporal location of events from the 
perspective of natural language semantics. The more general question 
accompanying my inquiry is what we can learn about fundamental properties of 
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time from a consideration of linguistic phenomena. The specific questions arising 
from my inquiry bear in particular on the (non-)reversibility of time and the 
(non-)persistence of the past. 
The article is structured as follows. I begin with a recollection of analyses 
of temporal language in logical approaches to natural language semantics 
(section 2). Then I consider some asymmetries between past and future that 
become manifest in language, which raise the questions of reversibility and 
persistence, and I present the “standard view” of the non-reversibility of time 
and the persistence of the past (section 3). Then I consider a puzzle about the 
changing past that challenges the standard view (section 4). I conclude 
suggesting an open-minded view on the fundamental questions.  
 
2.  Logical approaches to the semantics of temporal expressions 
Arthur Prior is the philosopher who laid the ground to logical approaches to the 
semantics of tense, by founding modern tense logic (Øhrstrøm and Hasle 1995; 
Copeland 2020; Goranko and Rumberg 2020). Preliminarily, we are interested 
in Prior’s philosophical ideas about time, which are particularly well-suited to 
think about history. It is not an accident that the first modern treatment of so-
called “historical modalities” (modalities such as “In 1932 it was possible for 
Great Britain to avoid war with Germany; but in 1937 it was impossible”; 
Thomason 1984), which were formalized by Richmond Thomason in the ‘70s and 
‘80s, sprang from Prior’s tense logic and from his views about indeterminism 
and what was later called “branching time” (the view that, at any moment in 
history, the world has only one past but several possible futures branching off 
from that moment; see section 3.2).  
Prior was a temporalist: he thought that human thoughts are 
fundamentally tensed and that the temporal notions of pastness, presentness 
and futurity are not expressible in the objectivist, atemporalist terms of the 
notion ‘time instant t1 precedes / follows time instant t2 in the series of times.’ 
He was also a presentist: he thought of the present as the fundamental 
perspective of human thought on reality, while he conceived of the past and the 
future, derivatively, as “displaced presents”—the past is what has been present 
and the future is what will be present (we’ll see shortly that this derivative 
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conception of the past and the future as displaced presents lies at the heart of 
Prior’s treatment of the past and the future qua grammatical categories, i.e. 
grammatical tenses). 
In these respects, Prior’s ideas differed dramatically from those of Willard 
Van Orman Quine. In his Word and Object, Quine writes: 
 
“Our ordinary language shows a tiresome bias in its treatment of time. 
Relations of date are exalted grammatically as relations of position, 
weight, and color are not. This bias is of itself an inelegance, or breach 
of theoretical simplicity. Moreover, the form that it takes — that of 
requiring that every verb form show a tense — is peculiarly productive 
of needless complications, since it demands lip service to time even 
when time is farthest from our thoughts. Hence in fashioning canonical 
notations it is usual to drop tense distinctions.” (Quine 1960) 
 
For Quine, tensed sentences such as (1a)-(1c) are a logically imperfect way to 
convey certain meanings and should be improved by regimenting the tensed 
expressions of everyday language in the objectivist terms provided by the 
mathematical ordering of times (according to the relation of precedence), 
accompanied by tenseless predications about such objectively ordered times. 
For example, (1a) should be regimented as (1a'):1 
 
(1) a’. The president is in Brussels at time t1 and t1 precedes the time t0 at 
which event e0 happens (and t1 is included by the day preceding t0). 
 
Prior’s advice is radically different: we should take our tensed talk seriously for 
what it is, not trying to reduce it to something else. The use of tensed forms, far 
from being logically imperfect, is a legitimate and meaningful way of expression. 
                                                          
1 In Quine’s regimentations, the verb form “is” is to be taken as the tenseless present of 
mathematics, as it shows up in eternally true statements such as “2 + 2 is equal to 4”, while the 
specification “at time t1” makes explicit—once and for all—the temporal reference which is left 
implicit by the logically imperfect sentences of our ordinary language, thus making the 
propositions expressed by those sentences eternally true or eternally false. The event e0 
introduced in the regimentations represents the event of their utterance. 
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Instead of regimenting our language to avoid such forms, we should rather 
devise a new logic capable of formalizing their meaning. 
 In the following sections I consider some logical approaches to temporal 
language, starting from Prior’s approach, and then moving to refinements of the 
latter which were motivated by certain limits inherent to Prior’s tense logic.  
 
2.1  Priorian tense operators 
In this presentation I use the graphical device of a line oriented from left to right 
to represent the temporal flow of events. The left part is associated with the 
past, the right part with the future. A designated point “t0” is associated with the 
present—the time at which the utterance happens.  
 
                          t0 
         Past                                                           Future 
 the present 
Fig. 1.  The time line. 
 
 Prior (1957) proposed a logical language containing two tense operators:2 
one for the past, one for the future. Syntactically, these operators, PAST (“it has 
been the case that …”) and FUT (“it will be the case that …”), are prefixed to a 
proposition p; this yields another proposition—a past tense proposition PAST(p), 
formalizing a sentence like (1a), or a future tense proposition FUT(p), 
formalizing a sentence like (1c). Prior’s idea, which he revived from Medieval 
Scholastics, was that a proposition takes a truth value, True or False, at a time. 
The value of a proposition at a time t1 may differ from its value at a different 
time t2. For instance, proposition (1b) may be True at September 20th, 2020 but 
False at September 21st, 2020 (the reason being that the president may be in 




                                                          
2 Prior (1957) actually introduced other temporal operators. For our purposes it will suffice to 
consider the operators described in the main text. 
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1. Prior’s tense operator PAST: 
 
 PAST(p) is true at t  if and only if  p is true at a time t' in the past of t. 
 
  t'                              t   
                                                                    
                          p                          PAST(p) 
Fig. 2.  Representation of the meaning of “PAST(p)”. 
 
2. Prior’s tense operator FUT: 
 
 FUT(p) is true at t  if and only if  p is true at a time t' in the future of t. 
 
 t                            t'  
                                                               
                          FUT(p)                          p 
Fig. 3.  Representation of the meaning of “FUT(p)”. 
 
To exemplify, suppose you uttered (1a) on the 20th of August, 2020: 
 
(1) a. (Ieri) il presidente dell’UCI era a Bruxelles. 
  
The Priorian logical structure of (1a) is (2): 
 
(2) PAST(the president of UCI is in Brussels) 
 
and (2) is evaluated as in (3): 
 
(3) (2) is true at the time of August 20th, 2020  if and only if  ‘the president of 




So far, we have been implicitly assuming that the time at which a 
proposition is evaluated is the present time t0. Though this is often the case, it 
is not always so. The proposition to which a tense operator is prefixed may be 
itself of the form PAST(p') or FUT(p'), so that the final proposition may have one 
of the following forms: 
 
(4) a. PAST(PAST(p')) 
 b. PAST(FUT(p')) 
 c. FUT(PAST(p')) 
 d. FUT(FUT(p')) 
 
Each of the formulas (4a)-(4d) may be associated to a particular tensed 
construction from natural language. Relevant tensed constructions are 
exemplified by the italicized parts of (4a')-(4d') (we read these sentences as 
making up a historical narrative, uttered at 2 PM on the same day as the reported 
events): 
 
(4) a'. At 9AM, the president had already arrived in Brussels. 
 b'. He would give his speech at 10AM. 
 c'. By 6PM he will already have returned to Linate Airport. 
 d'. He will be about to embark for Rome then. 
 
(4a') is the past of a past: the president’s arrival in Brussels is presented as past 
not just with respect to the present but to a past 9AM time. (4b') is the future 
of a past: the president’s speech is presented as future not with respect to the 
present but to that past 9AM time. (4c') is the past of a future: the president’s 
return to Linate Airport is presented as past not with respect to the present but 
to a future 6PM time. Finally, (4d') is the future of a future: the president’s 
embarkment for Rome is presented as future not just with respect to the present 
but to that future 6PM time.  
The discussion of (4a')-(4d') should clarify that the times at which the 
innermost tense operators in (4a)-(4d) are evaluated are distinct from the time 
of utterance: they are displaced either in the past or the future of it by the 
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outermost tense operators. While the broad temporal aspects of the meanings 
of (4a')-(4d') highlight a nice feature of the iteration of tense operators allowed 
in Prior’s tense logic, there are finer temporal aspects of those meanings that lie 
beyond the reach of this logic, thus showing its limits. One such crucial aspect 
is the reference to particular time points, so common in natural language, which 
is typically achieved via time adverbials (see [4a']-[4d']). 
 
2.2  Problems for the Priorian analysis of tense 
Consider the following scenario (due to Barbara Partee). While driving on the 
highway to go to the sea, you utter (5) as you remind that, at the point in which 
you left home, you forgot to turn off the stove: 
 
(5)  I didn’t turn off the stove! 
 
“The sentence clearly refers to a particular time […] whose 
identity is generally clear from the extra-linguistic context, just 
as the identity of the he in [the sentence He shouldn't be in here] is 
clear from the context.” (Partee 1973) 
 
Partee notes that there are two possible Priorian analyses of (5), according 
to whether PAST takes scope above negation, i.e. (5’), or below it, i.e. (5”): 
 
(5’) PAST(NOT(I turn off the stove)) 
(5”) NOT(PAST(I turn off the stove)) 
 
Consider the evaluation of (5’) first. Assuming that you utter (5) at 5PM, the 
truth conditions of your utterance under analysis (5’) are as follows: 
 
(6) (5’) is true at 5PM  if and only if  ‘I turn off the stove’ is false at some time 




Notice that these truth conditions come down to requiring that sometimes in the 
past you did not turn off the stove. Turning now to (5”), the truth conditions of 
your utterance under analysis (5”) are as follows: 
 
(7) (5”) is true at 5PM  if and only if  ‘I turn off the stove’ is true at no time t' 
in the past of 5PM 
 
These truth conditions come down to requiring that never in the past did you 
turn off the stove. 
The truth conditions predicted for your utterance under either one of (5’), 
(5”) are both empirically inadequate. On the one hand, those predicted under 
(5’) are too weak: there are lots of moments in the past in which you did not 
turn off the stove and might so satisfy the truth conditions in question; your 
utterance, however, is not about just any such moment, but about a particular 
one among them. On the other hand, the truth conditions predicted under (5”) 
are too strong: there are lots of moments in the past in which you turned off the 
stove; however, your utterance is not meant to deny that there is any such 
moment, but only to assert that you did not turn off the stove at a particular 
moment in the past. 
The consideration of Partee’s case clarifies, even without considering a 
sentence containing a time adverb, that Prior’s tense logical approach is hopeless 
in dealing with the phenomenon of reference to specific times. We had 
anticipated the problem discussing the referential aspects of the narrative (4a')-
(4d'): while Prior’s tense operators allow one to move backward and forward in 
time (to evaluate propositions with respect to times displaced from the hic et 
nunc of the utterance), they lack the power of targeting specific moments in the 
way that time adverbials do. Therefore, if we want a satisfactory analysis of 
temporal location in language, while keeping to Prior’s philosophical attitude, we 
need to refine Prior’s logic so as to give his tense operators “referential power.” 
 
2.3  Hybrid Tense Logic  
The following passage is from the entry Hybrid Logic of the Stanford 




“Hybrid [tense] logics are logics that result by adding further 
expressive power to ordinary [tense] logic. The most basic hybrid logic 
is obtained by adding so-called nominals which are propositional 
symbols of a new sort, each being true at exactly one [moment].” 
(Braüner 2017; emphasis added by FDP) 
 
Let’s illustrate what this means by applying it to Partee’s case. Let’s suppose 
that “t*” (a nominal) is a very specific proposition, True at exactly one moment, 
i.e. that particular moment in the past of your utterance in which you should 
have turned off the stove (in other words, “t*” is a proposition that univocally 
describes the state of the world at the moment in question). Given this property 
of “t*”, it follows that the conjunction “t* & NOT(I turn off the stove)” is a 
proposition True at at most one moment: if this conjunction is True at any 
moment, it cannot but be True at the unique moment at which “t*” is True. In 
Partee’s case, the meaning of your utterance of (5) can then be analysed along 
the lines of the logical paraphrase “it has been the case that the state of the 
world is as described by t* and I do not turn off the stove,” where “it has been 
the case that” is just Prior’s past tense operator, “the state of the world is as 
described by t*” is the very specific proposition that is True only at the crucial 
moment in the past referred to in your utterance, and “I do not turn off the 
stove” is the proposition (probably True at many moments in the past) that your 
utterance claims to be True at that same moment.  
The hybrid tense logical analysis of (5) is thus as in (5’’’), and the resulting 
truth conditions of your utterance are as in (8): 
 
(5)  I didn’t turn off the stove! 
(5’’’) PAST(t* & NOT(I turn off the stove)) 
(8) (5’’’) is true at 5PM if and only if  ‘I turn off the stove’ is false at some time 
t* in the past of 5PM coinciding with the moment the speaker is referring 




These truth conditions can be depicted as follows (the green spot on the time 
line represents the presupposed antecedent event of you turning on the stove 
and is added to have a complete pictorial representation of the situation, the red 
spot represents the event of you not turning off the stove at the crucial moment 
identified by the nominal “t*”): 
 
                           t*           t0 (= 5PM) 
                                                                                             
                                                                             Present time 
 
 I turn on the stove I do not turn off the stove 
 
Fig. 4.  “I didn’t turn off the stove.” 
 
In conclusion, the introduction of nominals—propositions that are True at 
exactly one moment—endow Prior’s tense logic with the referential power that 
this logic lacked.  
 
2.4  Hybrid Tense Logic and Reichenbachian semantics of tense 
An account of tense that is usually presented as an antagonist to Prior’s is due 
to Hans Reichenbach, who proposed an apparently more complex analysis of 
natural language tenses. A strong empirical motivation for Reichenbach’s 
analysis comes from compound tenses, e.g. the Past Perfect in (9), as opposed 
to the Simple Past in (10): 
 
(9)  [CONTEXT SENTENCE: Mary arrived at 3PM.] Peter had left. 
     (Inference: Peter’s departure happens earlier than Mary’s arrival.) 
 
(10)  [CONTEXT SENTENCE: Mary arrived at 3PM.] Peter left. 
     (Inference: Mary’s arrival happens as early as Peter’s departure.) 
 




“A particularly important form of token-reflexive symbol is found in the 
tenses of verbs. The tenses determine time with reference to the time 
point of the act of speech, i.e., of the token uttered. A closer analysis 
reveals that the time indication given by the tenses is of a rather 
complex structure. […] From a sentence like [(9)] we see that the time 
order expressed in the tense does not concern one event, but two 
events, whose positions are determined with respect to the point of 
speech. We shall call these time points the “point of the event” and the 
“point of reference.” In the example the point of the event is the time 
when Peter [left]; the point of reference is a time between this point 
and the point of speech. In an individual sentence like the one given it 
is not clear which time point is used as the point of reference. This 
determination is rather given by the context of speech.” (Reichenbach 
1947; I added the emphasis.) 
 
In this passage, Reichenbach draws his famous three-way distinction: 
 
• Speech point (S, time point of the token) 
• Reference point (R, the time of reference with respect to which the event 
is temporally located) 
• Event point (E, the running time of the event) 
 
This seems indeed to introduce some complexities with respect to Prior’s 
analysis. In particular, the notion of reference point does not seem to correspond 
to any construct in Prior’s tense logic. However, recall that Prior’s tense 
operators can be iterated (e.g. [4a]-[4d]); if we add to this the referential power 
provided by nominals, the prima facie difference between the two approaches 
might vanish.  
It has indeed been shown that Hybrid Tense Logic allows for a unification 
of Prior’s and Reichenbach’s insights about tense. A contribution in this direction 
comes from the work of Patrick Blackburn (Blackburn 1993, 1994). More 
recently, Blackburn and Jørgensen (2016) have argued “that Prior and 
Reichenbach are best viewed as allies, not antagonists” and they’ve done so “by 
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combining the central insights of Prior and Reichenbach in the framework of 
hybrid tense logic.” We illustrate how such a unification works via a couple of 
examples.  
For sentence (9), we have the following Reichenbachian analysis: 
 
                E  R        S 
PAST                                                                           FUTURE 
 
                                                                            Speech point 
     Peter leaves       contextually salient reference point 
 (= Mary’s arrival) 
Fig. 5.  Reichenbachian analysis of “[Mary arrived at 3PM.] Peter had 
left.” 
 
Using “r*” as a nominal describing the reference point R, we obtain the Hybrid 
Tense Logic analysis (9’) for (9): 
 
(9’)  PAST(r* & PAST(Peter leaves)) 
 
That is: it has been the case in the past that r* is True—and this takes us back 
to the time of Mary’s arrival—and it has been the case in the past of this other 
time that Peter leaves. This gives us the correct temporal order by which Peter’s 
departure precedes Mary’s arrival. 
For (10), we have the following Reichenbachian analysis (temporal 
coincidence between the event point and the reference point is depicted as 
spatial contiguity of the respective spots on the time line): 
 
                E=R        S 
                                                                          FUTURE 
                      Peter leaves Speech point 
Fig. 6.  Reichenbachian analysis of “[Mary arrived at 3PM.] Peter left.” 
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Again, using “r*” as a nominal describing the reference point R, we obtain the 
Hybrid Tense Logic analysis (10’) for (10): 
 
(10’)  PAST(r* & Peter leaves) 
 
That is: it has been the case in the past that r* is True—again, this takes us 
back to the time of Mary’s arrival—and that Peter leaves. This correctly gives us 
the coincidence between Mary’s arrival and Peter’s departure. 
 
2.5  Interaction between tense and temporal adverbs 
Time adverbs are typically used to constrain the temporal location of events 
(Dowty 1979). Consider (1a) again, repeated as (11): 
 
(11)  (Ieri) il presidente era a Bruxelles. 
 
                        YESTERDAY 
 
 E (= R)                 S 
PAST                                                                                              FUTURE 
 
            The president is in Brussels    Speech point 
Fig. 7.  Semantic contribution of “yesterday”. 
 
Semantically, adding the temporal adverb to the tensed verb in (11) comes down 
to constraining the temporal location of the event within the boundary of a 
particular time in the past: that past interval which corresponds to the day before 
the day of the utterance. 
 
2.5.1 Operator-based analysis of temporal adverbs    
David Dowty presents a problem for a prima facie plausible analysis of temporal 
adverbs in terms of Prior-style tense operators. He considers the following 
tentative analysis for the adverb “yesterday” (Dowty 1979): 
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 YESTERDAY(p) is true at t  iff  p is true at some time t' in the past of t 
which is within the day before t 
 
              Day-before-the-day-of-t 
 
 t'  t 
PAST                                                                                              FUTURE 
 p YESTERDAY(p) 
Fig. 8.  Operator-based analysis of “yesterday”. 
 
 Let’s assume now that (11) has the logical structure in (12) below. This 
formula then receives the truth conditions in (13): 
 
(12)  YESTERDAY(PAST(The president is in Brussells)) 
(13) “YESTERDAY(PAST(The president is in Brussells))” is true at t  iff  
“PAST(The president is in Brussells)” is true at some time t' in the past of 
t which is within the day before t  iff  “The president is in Brussells” is true 
at some time t'' such that, for some time t' in the past of t which is within 
the day before t, t'' is in the past of t 
 




      t"            t' t 
                                
 
 
 The P. is in Br.  PAST(the P. is in Br.) YESTERDAY(PAST(the P. is in Br.)) 
 




Clearly, this analysis does not work: it predicts that (11) is true now if the 
president was in Brussels one year ago. In other words, the analysis in question 
predicts that (11) means the same as “At some point within yesterday it was 
true that the president had been in Brussels in the past of that point,” which 
clearly is not the case. The same problem arises if we reverse the order of the 
operators PAST and YESTERDAY in (12), as shown in (14) (Dowty 1979: 323). 
 
(14) PAST(YESTERDAY(The president is in Brussells)) 
 
This alternative analysis does not work either since it predicts that (11) means 
the same as “At some point in the past it was true that the president had been 
in Brussels on the day before that point,” which is also true now if the president 
was in Brussels one year ago. 
In conclusion, we need to provide an account of the interaction between 
tense and temporal adverb which does not run into the empirical problem 
above—possibly keeping to Dowty’s idea to treat “yesterday” as a Prior-like 
temporal operator. 
 
2.5.2 Temporal adverbs in Hybrid Tense Logic 
Hybrid tense logic helps us out of the problem of the interaction of tense and 
time adverbs. The crucial insight is twofold: (a) the past tense and the temporal 
adverb both take scope over the nominal r* representing the reference point, 
and (b) they do so independently from one another. This scope and 
independence properties are shown by the hybrid tense logical formula in (15), 
which is evaluated as in (16): 
 
(15)  PAST(r* & the president is in Brussels) & YESTERDAY(r*) 
 
(16) (15) is true at time t  iff   
(a) ‘the president is in Brussels’ is true at some t’ in the past of t coinciding 
with the moment the speaker is referring to which is univocally 
described by r*; 
(b) r* is true at a time t’ in the past of t which is within the day before t. 
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The truth conditions in (16) correctly capture the temporal fact (involved in the 
meaning of [1a]) that ‘the president is in Brussels’ is true at some time t’ in the 
past of t which is within the day before t. 
 To summarize, the present section has been essentially devoted to 
presenting an outstanding formal approach to the semantics of tense, keeping 
an eye to its historical development. For the sake of this exposition, I have 
assumed the representation of time as a directed line, largely used by linguists, 
without problematizing it. In the next section I turn to some substantive 
questions regarding time as is represented in language.  
 
3.  Directionality of time in language and branching futures 
In this section I present linguistic data supporting the view of (a) the 
directionality of time and (b) the asymmetry between the uniqueness of the past 
and the plurality of the (possible) future(s).  
 
3.1  Temporal asymmetries: polarised scalar adverbs 
Having regard to the properties of time, some telling asymmetries appear as 
soon as we consider data such as the contrasts below (two interrogative marks 
in front of a sentence indicate that this is semantically anomalous): 
 
(17) a. È già tardi.  
  ‘It is already late.’  
b. ??È ancora tardi.  
‘It is still late.’ 
 
(18) a. È ancora presto.   
  ‘It is still early.’  
b. ??È già presto.  
‘It is already early.’ 
 
The so-called “phase adverbs” già ‘already’ and ancora ‘still’ display a puzzling 
behaviour in their interaction with the gradable adverbs presto ‘early’ and tardi 
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‘late’: each one of the former can meaningfully modify only one of the latter. 
Why so?  
Let’s characterize the contrasts above by drawing some pictures. First, we 
associate the adverbs presto and tardi with two regions of the time scale, 
separated by a transition point, i.e., a moment in time at which it is not early 
anymore and it is not late yet; the region associated with presto is located to 
the past side, while the region associated with tardi to the future side—obviously 
so, since what happens earlier in time becomes past at a point at which what 
happens later is future. 
 
 transition point 
PAST FUTURE 
 presto tardi 
Fig. 10.  Transition between the two regions presto – tardi on the time 
scale. 
 
The rationale behind the “pastward” orientation of the presto-arrow and the 
“futureward” orientation of the tardi-arrow is simple: presto has degrees that 
grow as you move from later times to earlier times, while tardi the other way 
round. 
 Next, we associate the adverbs ancora and già with two regions of some 
scale (not necessarily the time scale, for reasons clarified below), separated by 
a transition point, i.e., a point at which a certain property, P1, does not hold 
anymore while the opposite property, P2, does not hold yet; the region 
associated with ancora is located to the “low values” side of the scale while the 
region associated with già is located to the “high values” side. 
 
 transition point 
      P1 P2 
 ancora già 
Fig. 11.  Transition between the two regions ancora – già on a relevant 
scale (associated with gradable properties P1, P2). 
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It may not be obvious why ancora and già should be associated with regions of 
the scale in this way. Here is why: 
 
 ancora indicates that some gradable property, P1, continues to hold as one 
proceeds to values on the scale that are ever closer to the Point of 
Transition, PT; starting from PT, P1 ceases to hold and a gradable property 
P2, opposite to P1, begins to hold; 
 già indicates that P2 has begun to hold and will moreover hold at all higher 
values on the scale. 
 
Hereafter, I refer to ancora and già as “polarised scalar adverbs”: their 
meanings are defined on some relevant scale (which may be the time scale or 
other) and they are “polarised” since they are associated to opposite poles on 
that scale. 
 
3.1.1  Polarised scalar adverbs in non-temporal domains 
Consider the following context: 
 
Context NT1. We are looking for tall persons for a certain task (say, to pick 
fruits from apple trees). The minimal height required to do the task is 1m80cm 
(the transition point). Two candidates come to us, Leo and Teo, whose heights 
are 1m85 and 1m75, respectively. 
 
We can represent the situation of Context NT1 via a scale of height measures, 
ordered from smaller measures (in a region of the scale that we associate with 
the property ‘short’) to greater measures (in a region of the scale that we 
associate with the property ‘tall’): 
 
Fig. 12.  The situation of Context NT1. 
Stiamo cercando persone ALTE per un certo lavoro; possiamo allora usare i seguenti enunciati: 
 
(3a) Leo è già alto. 
    una persona dell'altezza di Leo (che non è granché) o più alta può essere scelta 
 
(4a) Teo è ancora basso. 
    una persona dell'altezza di Teo (che non è proprio poco) o più bassa non può essere 
anco a scelt
 
In questo caso, la scala di riferimento rispetto alla quale gli avverbi "già" e "ancora" vengono 
interpretati è questa: 
 
 transition point 
   
short Teo's height Leo's height  tall 
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Now, consider (19), as uttered in Context NT1: 
 
(19)  Leo è 1m85, è già (abbastanza) alto. Teo è 1m75, è ancora (troppo) basso. 
‘Leo is 1m85, he’s already (enough) tall. Teo is 1m75, he’s still (too) short.’ 
 
This sentence would be true in the envisaged situation. However, sentence (20), 
as uttered in Context NT1, would be meaningless: 
  
(20) Leo è 1m85, è ancora alto. Teo è 1m75, è già basso. 
 ‘Leo is 1m85, he is still tall. Teo is 1m75, he is already short.’ 
 
Let’s now consider the following alternative to Context NT1: 
 
Context NT2. We are looking for short persons for another task (say, to work 
in a room with a low ceiling). The maximal height allowed for this task is 
1m80cm. Two candidates come to us, Leo and Teo, whose heights are 1m85 
and 1m75, respectively.  
 
Again, we can represent the situation of Context NT2 via a scale of height 
measures, but notice that this time the height measures will be ordered from 
greater ones to smaller ones:  
 
 transition point (1m80) 
 
 tall Leo’s height Teo’s height short 
   
Fig. 13.  The situation of Context NT2. 
 
If we now consider (20) again, but this time as uttered in Context NT2, we can 
see that, far from being meaningless, (20) is now true. On the other hand, (19), 




We interpret the observations above by noting the following properties of 
già and ancora (we are focusing here on their use in non-temporal domains): 
 
 “Già” indicates upward persistence of a property. 
[In Context NT1: Leo’s height is enough and the same is true of any height 
following Leo’s on the relevant scale (Fig. 12); in Context NT2: Teo’s 
height is small enough and the same is true of any height following Teo’s 
on the relevant scale (Fig. 13).] 
 
 “Ancora” indicates downward persistence of a property. 
[In Context NT1: Teo’s height is not enough and the same is true of any 
height preceding Teo’s on the relevant scale (Fig. 12); in Context NT2: 
Leo’s height is not small enough and the same is true of any height 
preceding Leo’s on the relevant scale (Fig. 13).] 
 
(Compare these properties with what was captured in Figure 11.) 
 
3.1.2  Polarised scalar adverbs in the temporal domain 
Take the following context: 
 
Context T1. We are waiting for our friends, Leo and Teo, at a birthday party. 
They are expected to arrive by 9PM. Leo arrives by the expected time, but at 
9:10PM Teo still has to arrive. 
 
We can represent this situation via the usual time scale (where times are ordered 
from earlier to later): 
 9:10PM 
  PAST                                                                                                  FUTURE 
 Leo’s arrival Teo’s arrival 
Fig. 14.  The situation of Context T1. 
 
Suppose that at 9:10PM we utter (21): 
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(21)  Leo è già arrivato. Teo ancora non è arrivato. 
‘Leo has already arrived. Teo still has not arrived.’ 
 
This sentence is true in the envisaged situation. On the other hand, sentence 
(22), as uttered in Context T1, would be meaningless: 
  
(22) ??Leo è ancora arrivato. Teo è già non arrivato. 
‘Leo has still arrived. Teo has already not arrived.’ 
 
Let’s focus on the left sentence of (21) (Leo è già arrivato ‘Leo has already 
arrived’). Figure 15 depicts that part of its meaning—contributed by già—that I 
characterize in terms of forward persistence of a state (in time): 
 
 9:10PM 
    Past                                                                                            Future 
 Leo’s arrival e e e 
 [e = (state of) Leo having arrived] 
Fig. 15.  Forward persistence of Leo having arrived. 
 
The idea is simple: Leo arrived (at some point before 9PM), and from that point 
onward it will be forever true that Leo arrived. 
Turning to the right sentence of (21) (Teo ancora non è arrivato ‘Teo still 
has not arrived’), Figure 16 depicts that part of its meaning—contributed by 
ancora—that I characterize in terms of backward persistence of a state (in time): 
 
 9:10PM 
     Past                                                                                            Future 
 e e e Teo’s arrival 
 [e = (state of) Teo not having arrived] 
 
Fig. 16.  Backward persistence of Teo not having arrived (yet). 
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The idea, again, is simple: Teo has not arrived (yet) by some point after 9PM, 
and moving to the past of that point it is always true that Teo has not arrived 
(yet). 
We interpret the observations above by noting the following properties of 
già and ancora (this time we are focusing on their use in temporal domains): 
 
 “Già” indicates forward persistence of a state in time; with a formula:  
t  I [(t) & t’  I [t < t’  (t’)]] 
[Leo’s having arrived holds at 9:10PM and it also holds at any time 
following 9:10PM on the time scale] 
 “Ancora” indicates backward persistence of a state in time; with a formula: 
t  I [(t) & t’  I [t’ < t  (t’)]] 
[Teo’s not having arrived holds at 9:10PM and it also holds at any time 
preceding 9:10PM on the time scale] 
 
Let’s now turn to the following alternative to Context T1—this is in all 
respects like Context T1, except that we are now trying to reverse the time scale 
(via the “thought experiment” added in italics to the context description):3 
 
Context T2. We are waiting for our friends, Leo and Teo, at a birthday party. 
They are expected to arrive by 9PM. Leo arrives by the expected time, but at 
9:10PM Teo still has to arrive. We feel angry at Teo—he is always late!—and to 
defocus from our unpleasant feeling we imagine Teo’s arrival as being already 
there, to the future, as much real as Leo’s past arrival, and we imagine that we 
are moving through time from Teo’s arrival back to Leo’s arrival. 
 
This time the situation is represented as follows (notice the peculiar orientation 
of the time line from the future to the past, i.e. the ordering of times from later 
to earlier):  
                                                          
3 We want to see if we can rescue (22) by inverting the “natural” (earlier-to-later) order of times. 
Recall that, in the passage from Context NT1 to Context NT2, we were able to rescue (20) by 





   Future                                                                                         Past 
 Teo’s arrival Leo’s arrival 
Fig. 17.  The situation of Context T2. 
 
Crucially, (22) continues to be meaningless, even if considered as uttered in 
Context T2—hence, against the reversed time scale of Fig. 17. On the one hand, 
the left sentence of (22), if it could ever mean anything, would mean the same 
as ‘at 9:10PM, Leo is still (in the state of having) arrived;’ this doesn’t seem to 
be a meaningful thought to be ever expressed! On the other, the right sentence 
of (22), if it could ever mean anything, would mean the same as ‘at 9:10PM, 
Teo is already (in the state of having) not arrived;’ this, too, doesn’t seem to 
possibly make any sense! 
The moral of this section concerns a fundamental difference between time 
versus other types of scales. The different behaviour of the adverbs ancora / già 
in the non-temporal contexts NT1 - NT2 and in the temporal contexts T1 - T2 
suggests that the natural ordering characterizing time cannot be reversed in the 
same way as the smaller-to-greater relation characterizing the scale of degrees 
of height (we chose the pair of predicates alto - basso but we could have made 
our point by picking a different pair of non-temporal antonyms). 
 
3.2  Asymmetry between past and future 
Section 3.1 has shown some evidence that time is represented as directional in 
language: unlike other kinds of scales that natural language meanings rely on, 
time is characterized by a “natural” ordering that is not reversible. We consider 
now whether there are other properties of time, revealed by linguistic data, that 
may have a relation to this directionality property. It turns out that there is 
another one, on which an abundant literature on the asymmetry between the 






3.2.1 Many futures, one past 
There are data suggesting that the traditional linear representation of time is too 
simplistic—this representation may be useful for the purpose of analysing certain 
temporal aspects of natural language meaning, but it is limited when one comes 
to the analysis of more subtle data at the crossroads of temporality and modality.  
Consider the contrast between (23a) and (23b): 
 
(23) a. The meeting will take place in Room C, unless the management 
makes the Aula Magna available. 
 b. The meeting took place in Room C, unless the management made 
the Aula Magna available. 
 
On the one hand, (23a) expresses a condition for the future occurrence of the 
meeting in Room C, namely that the management will not choose the Aula 
Magna instead. The “unless” clause in this sentence introduces this condition 
without making it so that the main clause in the future tense (“The meeting will 
take place in Room C”) is not asserted—the latter is asserted in spite of the 
“unless” clause, which only has the effect of qualifying the assertion (Condoravdi 
2003). In (23b), on the other hand, the “unless” clause has a different effect: it 
makes it so that the main clause in the past tense (“The meeting took place in 
Room C”) can no longer be seen as asserted, once the “unless” is processed.  
 Another relevant contrast is that between (24a) and (24b): 
 
(24) a. The management made the Aula Magna available before the meeting 
took place in Room C. 
 b. The management made the Aula Magna available after the meeting 
took place in Room C. 
 
On the one hand, in (24a) the meeting taking place in Room C is still future with 
respect to the management making the Aula Magna available and the very fact 
that the management made the Aula Magna available may well have had the 
effect that the meeting didn’t take place in Room C after all (because it probably 
took place in Aula Magna instead). On the other hand, in (24b) the meeting 
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taking place in Room C is already past with respect to the management making 
the Aula Magna available, and the fact that the management made the Aula 
Magna available cannot possibly have had the effect that the meeting didn’t take 
place in Room C—what is past cannot be canceled. 
 Let’s consider one final contrast, the one between the Question-Answer 
pairs in (25a) and (25b): 
 
(25) a. Q: Where will the meeting take pace?  
  A: The ministers have two places available. It may take place in 
Room C or in Aula Magna.’ 
b. Q: Where did the meeting take pace?  
A: The ministers had two places available. It may have taken place 
in Room C or in Aula Magna. 
 
Only in (25b) does the modal mean that the speaker does not know which room, 
while the issue is objectively settled. In (25a) the modal does not (at least, not 
necessarily) mean that the speaker does not know which room and it means 
instead (at least, under a very plausible reading of the sentence) that the issue 
is objectively open. 
The general idea brought to salience by such linguistic contrasts is an old 
and venerable idea: the past is fixed and determinate, the future is open and 
indeterminate (Aristotle 1984, Prior 1967, Thomason 1984, Belnap et al. 2001, 
Condoravdi 2003). 
 
3.2.2 “Branching time” approaches to the past-future asymmetry 
At this point, the Priorian attitude toward temporal language shows up again. A 
little bit more formally, the idea is that our world, considered from the 
perspective of any moment m0 in its history, has a unique actual past and 
present—the actual past and the actual present at m0—but many metaphysically 
(not just epistemically) possible futures—the possible futures at m0. A very 
natural way to represent this view diagrammatically, and to translate it next into 
a formal model, is the following: 
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a) represent the unicity of the past at m0 as a single oriented line (usual left-
to-right orientation) that ends at m0 (see the green line in Figure 18); 
b) represent the plurality of the future at m0 as a manifold of oriented lines 
branching off from m0—all such lines begin at m0 and proceed rightward, 
possibly breaking into different lines at subsequent moments (see the red 
lines in Figure 18); 
c) represent the world itself, as considered from the perspective of moment 
m0, as the cluster of all histories passing through m0—where by “history” 
it is meant a complete linear path made up of moments temporally 










Fig. 18.  “Branching Time” representation of our world from the 
perspective of moment m0. 
 
The resulting model has been known as “Branching Time” (Prior 1967, Thomason 
1984, Belnap et al. 2001).  
Let me illustrate the basic concepts of Branching Time by discussing the 
structure of Figure 18. This has four histories: h1, h2, h3 and h4. Moment m0 
belongs to all four. It can thus be said that there are four possible futures at m0: 
the four paths that our world can take after m0, following one or the other of h1-
h4. Moment m' only belongs to h1 and h2. It can thus be said that m' only has 
two possible futures, corresponding to h1 and h2, while h3 and h4, which were 
possible futures at m0, are no longer possible futures at m'. Similarly, moment 
m'' only belongs to h3 and h4 and can then be said to only have two possible 


















to this shortly). Regarding the ordering of moments via the earlier-to-later 
relation, not all moments are temporally connected with each other: while m0 is 
in the past of both m' and m'' (and is so connected with both), m' is not in the 
past of m'' nor is m'' in the past of m' (thus, m' and m'' are not connected with 
each other). The fact is that m' and m'' are moments lying on alternative futures; 
each of these futures may end up becoming actual, but, crucially, they could not 
become both actual (though many alternative courses of events may be possible 
at a given point, history always ends up realizing only one of them).  
Notice that the Branching Time model lends itself naturally to a “growing 
block” view of the past: the past of our world “grows” as we move forward in 
time, for instance from m0 to m' (the past at m' is a “larger block” than the past 
at m0). This is a sense—the only sense—in which the past can be said to 
“change”. In all other respects, it is immutable. In particular, what is past at a 
moment mi continues to be past at any later moment mj; in this sense, there 
may be no loss of past as time goes by. One thus finds a sharp contrast with the 
future: what is a possible future at a moment mi may no longer be a possible 
future at a later moment mj; in this sense, there may be loss of possible futures 
as time goes by. 
 The Branching Time model allows us to account for the asymmetries 
observed in the interpretation of (23a,b), (24a,b) and (25a,b) above. To prove 
this, I should provide formal analyses in Branching Time of the relevant linguistic 
constructions featuring in those sentences. For reasons of space, I’ll confine 
myself to discussing the before / after contrast in (24a,b), against the temporal 
structure of Figure 18. Suppose that (i) the management makes the Aula Magna 
available at m0, (ii) the meeting takes place in Room C at m' but not at m" 
(notice that supposition (ii) is coherent since m' and m" are on alternative 
futures for m0, and what happens in one future may not happen in the other). 
Suppose further that, (iii) right after m0, the world takes the path of history h4, 
thus going through the moment m" in which the meeting does not take place in 
Room C. Given (i)-(iii), an utterance of (24a) made right after m0 would be True: 
the Aula Magna is made available at a moment, m0, at which the meeting taking 
place in Room C has not occurred yet and the latter event occurs at a moment, 
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m', in a possible future of m0; however, the event in question does not occur in 
a different future of m0, i.e. h4, which ends up becoming the actual future. 
Suppose now that (a) the meeting takes place in Room C at m0, (b) the 
management makes the Aula Magna available at m', and (c) right after m0, the 
world takes the path of history h1, thus going through the moment m' in which 
the management makes the Aula Magna available. Given (a)-(c), an utterance 
of (24b) made right after m' would be True: the Aula Magna is made available 
at a moment, m', at which the meeting taking place in Room C has already 
occurred, since the latter event occurs at a moment, m0, in the past of m'; since 
m' has only one past, it is not possible that the meeting taking place in Room C 
does not occur in a different past of m' (once this event has occurred, there is 
nothing you can do which could make it not have occurred!).  
The two reasonings above are just a sketch of an account of how A before 
B can be true in a history without B ever being true in that history and how A 
after B can be true in a history only when B is also true in that history.4 
 
3.2.3 Formal analyses of the past and the future tenses in Branching 
Time. 
As we consider the future tense, the Branching Time model offers us different 
options to formally analyse it. The availability of different options is expected, 
given the complexity of the future dimension that is captured by this model.  
One important option is the so-called “Peircean future” (Prior 1967): 
 
• “FUT(p)” is true at m0  if and only if  “p” is true at a moment following m0 






                                                          
4 These properties are known as the “non-veridicality” of before (the truth of A before B does not 
entail that B is true) and the “veridicality” of after (the truth of A after B entails the truth of B). 





     p h2  
 FUT(p)  p 
h3 
Fig. 19.  “Peircean” future. 
 
On the Peircean solution, future tensed sentences are essentially necessity 
modal sentences. This solution thus predicts that the future contingent 
statement (FC) is equivalent to the necessity modal statement (NF): 
 
(FC) There will be a sea battle tomorrow. 
(NF) It is now necessary that a sea battle will occur tomorrow. 
 
This can be criticized as an undesirable outcome of the solution in question. 
Another notable solution is known as the “Ockhamist future” (Prior 1967): 
 
• “FUT(p)” is true at m0  if and only if  “p” is true at a moment following m0 




   h2 
 FUT(p) 
h3 
Fig. 20.  “Ockhamist” future. 
 
The Ockhamist solution is based on the idea that, although there are many 
possible futures at m0, only one of these will be actual (the one corresponding 
to h* in Figure 20) and a future tensed statement made at m0 targets this only 
future. This solution has the following consequence: if I assert at m0 “there will 
be a sea battle tomorrow” and on the day following the day of m0 (in the history 
that becomes actual) there happens (not) to be a sea battle, then my assertion 
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is (not) True, regardless of what happens in the other histories that were 
possible futures at m0. This consequence has some intuitive appeal—we do look 
at what actually happened when we have to assess past utterances of future 
tensed sentences for truth (MacFarlane 2003). Besides this, the Ockhamist 
solution (unlike the Peircean) preserves the contingent character of (FC) above, 
as distinct from the necessity modal statement (NF). I’ll leave it open what is 
the empirically most adequate analysis of the future tense in Branching Time. 
Let’s turn to the past tense. It should be obvious that Branching Time does 
not provide us with several options in this case—for a “backward looking” tense 
operator (like PAST), it does not make any difference whether the temporal 
structure is the traditional linear structure, or whether it is the tree-shaped 
structure of Branching Time: as long as we look backward in time, we always 
face a linear path. The past tense operator can thus be defined in the following 
straightforward way (making no reference to any particular history): 
 




 m' m0 
    h2 
 p PAST(p) 
h3 
 
Fig. 21.  The past in Branching Time. 
 
Since there is a unique history (or, more precisely, a unique path) going 
backward from moment m0, the past tense does not raise a problem of definition 
in the same way as the future tense does. We only need to look at that unique 
past history (path) and check whether it contains a moment at which p holds or 
not. 
Given Branching Time, there is a sense in which PAST(p), unlike FUT(p), 
when true, is not just contingently true but true by necessity: 
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 If p is now past, then it is now necessary that p is past (thesis of the 
“necessity of the past”). 
 
The relevant notion of necessity is what has been called historical necessity 
(Thomason 1984); taking the symbol “NEC” to denote historical necessity, this 
notion can be defined as in (HN) and the above thesis of the “necessity of the 
past” can be formulated as in (NP): 
 
(HN) “NEC(p)” is true at m  if and only if  “p” is true at m in every history 
passing through m. 
 
(NP) PAST(p)  NEC(PAST(p)) 
 
 In conclusion, Branching Time provides for a sense in which the past is 
necessary. This is the way in which this model formally captures the standard 
view of the non-modifiability (or persistence) of the past. In the next section I 
introduce a puzzle that challenges this view. 
 
4.  The Puzzle of the “Changing Past” 
Barlassina and Del Prete (2015) (hereafter, B&DP) present the following puzzle 
about the past. Preliminarily, some technical vocabulary: 
 
 People utter sentences at contexts, represented as pairs <w, t> of a world 
and a time (the world and the time of the utterance). 
 Sentences express propositions at contexts.   
 A sentence S is temporally specific if and only if, for any context c, the 
proposition expressed by S at c is about a specific time.   
 A sentence S is about the past in a context c if and only if the proposition 
expressed by S at c is about a time that precedes c.  
 A temporally specific sentence S that is about the past in a context c is 
true in c if and only if the time the proposition p expressed by S in c is 
about has, relative to the past of c, the property that p ascribes to it. 
 A context c' is a successive same-world context to context c if and only if:  
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the world of c' is the same as the world of c,  
the time of c' follows the time of c. 
 A sentence is context-insensitive if and only if it expresses the same 
proposition at all contexts.  
 
Their starting point is what they take to be a platitude: we say true (false) 
things about the past and the truth (falsity) of what we say depends on how the 
past is. This is made formally precise as follows:  
 
 Truth About the Past (TAP) 
Let S, c, p, Q, t be such that: S is a temporally specific sentence that is 
about a past time in context c, p is the proposition expressed by S at c, 
and Q is the property that p ascribes to the specific time t. Then, S is true 
in c if and only if t has property Q relative to the past of c. 
 
To see how TAP works, consider sentence  
 
(26) Barack Obama was born in 1961.  
 
as uttered in context <@, 23rd May 2019>—this consists of our actual world @ 
and time 23rd May 2019. (26) is temporally specific (it is about the year 1961), 
it is about the past (the year 1961 is in the past of 23rd May 2019), and the 
proposition it expresses at <@, 23rd May 2019> (i.e., that Obama was born in 
1961) ascribes to the year 1961 the property of being a time in which Obama 
was born. By TAP, (26) is true in <@, 23rd May 2019> since, relative to the past 
of <@, 23rd May 2019>, the year 1961 has indeed the property of being a time 
in which Obama was born. 
B&DP ask us next to consider the following story (almost true—apart from 
the fictional character of Frank): 
 
“It is the 23rd of July 2000. Being the rider with the lowest overall time 
at the end of the last stage, Lance Armstrong is declared the winner of 
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the Tour de France by Union du Cyclisme Internationale (UCI). On <@, 
25th December 2002> (hereafter, Context A), Frank utters [(27)]: 
 
[(27)]  Lance Armstrong won the Tour de France in 2000. 
 
There is a clear intuition that Frank said something true. Time goes by. 
Having discovered that Armstrong made use of banned substances, on 
the 22nd of October 2012 UCI withdraws all of Armstrong’s wins at TdF. 
As Frank is not aware of this fact, he utters [(27)] again at <@, 25th 
December 2012> (hereafter, Context B). This time, it seems that Frank 
said something false.” 
 
Based on this story, they present the following reasoning, leading to the 
paradoxical conclusion in F: 
 
(A) (27) is a temporally specific sentence: for any context c, the proposition 
expressed by (27) at c is about the year 2000; 
(B) (27) is about the past in both Context A and Context B; 
(C) (27) is context-insensitive (it does not contain any context-sensitive 
element—demonstratives, indexicals, or the like), hence it expresses the 
same proposition at both Context A and Context B, namely, that Armstrong 
won the TdF in 2000;  
(D) (27) is true in Context A, hence it follows from TAP that, relative to the 
past of Context A, the year 2000 has the property of being a time in which 
Armstrong won the TdF; 
(E) (27) is false in Context B, hence it follows from TAP that, relative to the 
past of Context B, the year 2000 does not have the property of being a time 
in which Armstrong won the TdF; 
(F) Context B is a successive same-world context to Context A (Context A 
and Context B are located in the same world, @), hence in moving from 
Context A to Context B the past (of the actual world) has changed: the year 
2000 had a certain property on Christmas 2002, but did not have that 




B&DP consider two objections to the puzzling conclusion in (F). The first 
one contends that there is no truth value change for (27), hence questioning the 
joint truth of (D) and (E). One variant of this objection consists in claiming that 
(27) was already false in Context A because Armstrong got the lowest time only 
by cheating. The other variant consists in claiming that (27) was still true in 
Context B because sincere and informed speakers assert (27), or sentences 
implying (27), after the revocation of Armstrong’s titles (for instance, they assert 
true historical sentences such as “Armstrong won the TdF seven times from 1999 
to 2005. He was later stripped of those titles for doping” …). The second 
objection contends that (27) has some hidden context-sensitivity (due to the 
verb phrase ‘win the TdF in 2000’), against assumption (C): in Context A, (27) 
would express the proposition that Armstrong won the TdF in 2000 according to 
the declaration of Context A, but in Context B, it would express the different 
proposition that Armstrong won the TdF in 2000 according to the declaration of 
Context B. B&DP reply to each objection with detailed linguistic arguments that 
I cannot recall here. Notice that, if they are right, there might be other cases in 
which our past can change and this would force us to try to make sense of this. 
 
5. Conclusion 
We reviewed some classical approaches, from logic and philosophy, to temporal 
meaning in natural language, beginning with the subject of temporal location of 
events in language and moving then to general properties of time as may be 
revealed by semantic analysis. Throughout the article, the analytical attitude 
toward temporal language has been inspired by the sort of logical approach to 
time and tense that Prior developed in the 1950s and ‘60s. Building on previous 
work on historical modalities, we introduced the asymmetry between closed past 
and open future, showing some linguistic correlates of it, and presented the 
Branching Time model as a formal tool to capture this asymmetry and to build 
enlightening semantic analyses of a number of linguistic contrasts. Finally, we 
considered a paradoxical argument whose conclusion challenges the traditional 
view of the persistence of the past. If its proponents are right, we should stop 
asking whether the past can change and start to think how this could be. One 
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might notice that the argument is based on a special property of winning events, 
namely their annullability, and on this basis might contend that the puzzle is not 
generalizable to other sorts of events that are not annullable in the same way—
for instance: though it was possible for UCI in 2012 to make it the case that 
Armstrong did not win the TdF in 2000, how could it be possible for anyone after 
the 2000 TdF to make it the case that Armstrong did not have the lowest overall 
time at the end of the last stage or that he did not ascend the Hautacam on the 
10th of July? It seems hard to erase events of the latter sort from history. These 
speculative remarks raise the question of a distinction between two sorts of 
events, with events such as winning the TdF being of one sort and events such 
as ascending the Hautacam on a bicycle being of the other sort. Providing an 
explicit characterization of the two sorts of events—one which would allow for a 
neat separation, among the events reported in our historical narratives,  
between events of one sort and events of the other sort—might prove to be a 
difficult task.  
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